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Abstract—The telecommunication networks of telecontrol sys-
tems in electric utilities have undergone an innovation process. 
This has removed many of their technical restrictions and made 
it possible to consider carrying out telecontrol tasks with general 
standard protocols instead of the specific ones that are used 
currently. These are defined in the standards 60870-5, 60870-6, 
and 61850 from the International Electrotechnical Commission, 
among others. This paper is about the implementation, using 
the services of general standard protocols, of the telecontrol 
application functions defined by the standard IEC 60870-5-104. 
The general protocols used to carry out telecontrol tasks are those 
used in the Internet: the telecommunication network-management 
protocol SNMPv3 (simple network management protocol version 
3), the clock synchronization protocol network time protocol and 
Secure SHell. With this new implementation, we have achieved, 
among others, two important aims: 1) to improve performance 
and, above all, 2) to solve the serious security problems present 
in the telecontrol protocols currently being used. These problems 
were presented by IEEE in an article published in the website 
of the IEEE Standards Association. In this paper, the use of 
general standard protocols to perform the telecontrol of electrical 
networks is justified. The development of this paper—its achieve-
ments and conclusions and the tools used—is detailed.
Index Terms—Computer network-management protocols, In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60870-5 series, 
internet protocols, performance, security, telecontrol.
I. INTRODUCTION
I
N THE field of electrical network telecontrol, the proto-
cols traditionally used are either vendor specific or a re-
sult of standardizing efforts in this specific area [for instance,
the telecontrol protocols from the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC)]. These types of solutions make sense in ap-
plications with strong real-time restrictions and slow transmis-
sion speeds. However, although real-time restrictions are still
present, speed restrictions are not.
In different European electrical networks [1], the communi-
cation networks of the telecontrol systems have undergone a 
generalized innovation process, since the 1990s. This innova-
tion process has made many of the private aspects of these net-
works more open and standard. The following changes were
introduced:
• use of digital technologies with broader bandwidth: op-
tical fiber, digital radio links, digital power-line communi-
cations (PLC), mobile phone, etc.; this has removed speed
restrictions prevailing until some decades ago;
• use of standard protocols: specifically those defined by
IEC 60870-5 series for the communication between control
centers (CCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs), by IEC
60870-6 series for communication between control centers
and by IEC 61850 for communication inside a substation;
• use of standard reference models: open system intercon-
nection (OSI ) [2]–[5]; enhanced performance architecture
(EPA) [6] and transport control protocol/Internet protocol
(TCP/IP) [7]–[9];
• use of more intelligent RTUs, relieving network and con-
trol centers from the load.
The features of the telecommunication networks, as a result of
this evolution, make it possible to carry out the telecontrol tasks
by using general standard protocols that are not characteristic
of the telecontrol field, such as the case of the network-manage-
ment protocol Simple Network Management Protocol version
3 (SNMPv3) [10]–[12], the clock synchronization protocol net-
work time protocol (NTP) [13] and Secure SHell (SSH) [14],
members of the TCP/IP architecture. These solutions are more
flexible and have a higher rate of commercial penetration and
standardization. This approach opens up a new field of solu-
tions that permits the exploitation of all the rich and dynamic
experience of other fields which are constantly evolving, such
as network management as well as time and session protocols
for electrical networks.
These protocols have the advantages derived from their wide-
spread use, such as reliability (since they are fully debugged),
continuous update, and cost-effectiveness produced by the inde-
pendence from vendors (since free implementation is available).
Some IEC key standards for power systems, such as the 61850
set, are still under development or in an early stage of produc-
tion compared with these protocols. Furthermore, the serious
security problems of the protocols in the IEC 60870 series have
been solved by using these protocols. These security problems
have been highlighted and faced by IEEE, as can be seen in an
article published in the website of the IEEE Standards Associ-
ation [15].
To sum up, the purpose of this paper is to perform power
system telecontrol by means of general standard protocols in-
stead of the specific telecontrol protocols currently used. In this
way, it is possible to take advantage of the features of the new
communication networks of the telecontrol systems. These gen-
eral standard protocols have important advantages, such as relia-
bility, robustness, security, continuous update, and saving. This
paper improves performance and solves the security problems
present in the telecontrol protocols that are currently used.
In Section II, the telecontrol functions defined in the IEC
60870-5 series are outlined, while Section III focuses on the
Internet protocols used for implementing these functions. Sec-
tion IV describes in detail the implementation of these telecon-
trol functions over the services of SNMPv3. Section V studies
security issues related to power systems telecontrol networks. In
this section, we expose the security threats that can affect these
networks, the security models of SNMPv3, other alternatives to
achieve security and the repercussions of using open or closed
protocols in the security. Section VI shows the outcomes of the
performance analysis and compares the performance of our im-
plementation with that of another using TCP/IP services, ruled
by the standard IEC 60870-5-104. Conclusions by the authors
are presented in Section VII.
II. TELECONTROL FUNCTIONS OF THE IEC 60870-5 SERIES
This series [6], [16]–[22] defines a set of protocols to regulate
the communications between control centers and RTUs.
The standard IEC 60870-5-104 deals with the interchange of
telecontrol messages between control centers and RTUs con-
nected via data networks, using TCP/IP. It adds a transport and
a network layer to the EPA model. It sets the correspondence
between the telecontrol functions defined by the document 5 of
this series and the services supplied by TCP/IP. The application
functions we have implemented by using SNMPv3, SSH and
NTP services will be briefly described.
Station Initialization (SI): This function sets the involved sta-
tion in a correct state of operation and has three categories: 1)
initialization of the primary station (SI-IPS), 2) local initializa-
tion of the secondary station (SI-LISS), and remote initialization
of the secondary station (SI-RISS).
Data Acquisition by Polling (DAP): The control center polls
RTUs for updated information. The standard 104 advises against
using this function because of the overload it generates.
Cyclic Data Transmission (CDT): This is a low priority func-
tion by which RTUs can take the initiative in sending data to the
control center.
Acquisition of Events (AE): The RTU informs the control
center about important and unexpected events. This is a high
priority function.
General Interrogation (GI): This function is executed by the
control center after a data loss or an internal initialization to ask
the RTU for the updated values of all of its process variables.
Clock Synchronization (CS): This function is executed by the
control center after an initialization and periodically to synchro-
nize its clock with the RTUs. It can be carried out only if the
maximum delay of the network is smaller than the required time
accuracy.
Command Transmission (CT): By means of this function,
the control center can execute actions in the RTUs. There are
two categories: 1) “Direct Commands” (CT-DC) and 2) “Select
and Execute Commands” (CT-SEC). “Select and Execute Com-
mands” allow the control center to prepare RTU for the execu-
tion of an action, check if it is ready, and after the verification
execute that action.
Transmission of Integrated Totals (TIT): The control center
obtains values from the RTUs counters. This function can be
initiated locally by the secondary (TIT-S) or remotely by the
primary station (TIT-P) and has two categories: 1) transmission
of integrated total and 2) transmission of incremental informa-
tion, depending on whether the counters are reset or not.
Parameter Loading (PL): This function allows the control
center to modify RTUs parameters, such as limits of measures,
timer values, etc. Generally, the parameter loading is carried
out in two phases: 1) parameter loading and 2) activation of the
previously loaded parameters. This function can be initiated by
primary (PL-P) and secondary (PL-S) stations. There are three
kinds of parameters: 1) A; 2) B (PL-X-AB); and 3) C (PL-X-C),
where X is the abbreviation of the initiator station.
Test Procedure (TP): The control center tests the connection
with an RTU.
File Transfer (FT): When the volume of information to be
transferred is too big to fit in an application service data unit
(ASDU), it is transferred in files. This file transfer is bidirec-
tional and has three categories: 1) file transfer from primary to
secondary station (FT-PS); 2) file transfer from the secondary to
primary station initiated by primary station (FT-SPP); and the
file transfer from secondary to primary station initiated by the
secondary station (FT-SPS).
III. PROTOCOLS
This section is about the protocols used to implement the
telecontrol application functions defined by IEC 60870-5-104.
These protocols are SNMPv3, SSH and NTP.
A. SNMPv3
The simple network management protocol version 3 is a
de-facto standard and a member of the TCP/IP architecture.
Most of the telecontrol functions mentioned (all except CS and
the final phase of FT) were implemented by using the services
provided by this protocol. This section is about this standard,
its network-management model, and Net-SNMP (the imple-
mentation of SNMPv3 used to implement these functions).
1) Internet Network-Management Model: A network-man-
agement system can be defined as the set of elements that allow
the supervision, analysis, and control of the resources and ac-
tivities of a communication network in an effective and efficient
way.
To carry out our implementation, the internet network-man-
agement model has been taken as the basis and adapted to the ar-
chitecture of a telecontrol system. Their components have been
related, identifying the role played by each element of a tele-
control system as a component of a management system.
The architecture of a network-management system based
on SNMP (Fig. 1) includes a set of management stations and
the elements managed by them. The management stations
(or managers) run management applications that monitor and
control the elements of the network; their main task is polling
Fig. 1. Internet network-management model.
the agents present in those elements to demand necessary
information to manage the network. The managed elements are
devices (routers, gateways, servers, hubs, hosts, etc.) running
agent software which responds to the information and action
requests from a manager and can provide it with important
and nonrequested information by an asynchronous mechanism
called traps.
The managed elements and their attributes are represented by
variables belonging to a management database, or management
information base (MIB). The manager monitors the network by
reading and writing the values of the MIB objects.
The communication between the manager and the agents is
ruled by the network-management protocol SNMPv3 operating
in the application layer.
When studying the Internet network-management model, we
must deal with the management protocol and the information
handled by it.
Regarding information, the MIB specifies which data must
be stored by the agent and the access permission of the manager
to these data. The structure of management information (SMI)
[23] determines the rules used to define the variables of the MIB.
These rules determine the valid types for MIB variables and
specify how to define new types.
SNMP is the protocol used for managing the elements of
the network. It defines the format and the meaning of the mes-
sages exchanged by SNMP entities. SNMP is a very simple
protocol which satisfies network-management requirements and
consumes very few resources from the network wherein it is
installed. This protocol allows the manager to read and write
the values of objects represented as variables in the agent’s
MIB. SNMP is based on the fetch-store paradigm. Conceptually,
SNMP has only two commands, allowing a manager to get and
set an object value. All of the remaining operations are defined
by using these two commands. Another advantage of SNMP is
that these days, it is the most widespread network-management
protocol, supported by almost all of the devices.
SNMPv3 is the version of the protocol that has been used
to implement the telecontrol functions determined by the stan-
dard IEC 60870-5-104. This protocol is defined in the request
for comments (RFCs) 3410 to 3415. It presents a very high level
of security, regarding both access control and message security
(replay protection, data integrity, authentication and data con-
fidentiality via encryption). This has been a key factor in our
implementation, as we will expose later.
Its PDUs are:
• GetRequest, GetNextRequest, and GetBulkRequest: the
manager gets the values of one or more variables from the
agent’s MIB;
• SetRequest: the manager sets the values of one or more
variables from the agent’s MIB;
• InformRequest: by means of this PDU, a manager notifies
another of which information from its own MIB is acces-
sible;
• Response: this is the response to the request PDUs; it con-
tains either the requested information or the result of the
requested operation;
• SNMPv2-Trap: by means of this PDU, the agent can asyn-
chronously notify the manager of the occurrence of an
event; this PDU is a heritage from SNMPv2.
2) Net-SNMP: Net-SNMP is the package used to imple-
ment the telecontrol functions defined by IEC 60870-5-104. It
comes from the Carnegie-Mellon University—Simple Network
Management Protocol (CMU-SNMP) and dates back to 1992
at Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. It began as an
implementation of SNMPv1. Later, its source code was made
publicly available and so, is open to individuals and compa-
nies for their use and modification. Since 1995, this project
was adopted, enhanced, and made easier to use by universities
and private people from several countries under the coordina-
tion of University of California at Davis and giving rise to the
University of California, Davis—Simple Network Management
Protocol (UCD-SNMP). Finally, UCD-SNMP became an open-
code project with the concurrent versions system (CVS), and
at the end of 2000, the project changed its name to Net-SNMP
since collaborators were spread all over the world. It was moved
to SourceForge so that administrative tasks were shared out.
The current version of Net-SNMP includes a set of tools:
• command-line applications to read and write information
from an SNMP agent, remotely configure it, and handle
different formats of MIB object identifiers;
• graphical MIB browser;
• daemon for receiving and managing SNMP notifications;
• extensible agent for responding to SNMP queries for man-
agement information; this includes built-in support for a
wide range of MIB modules and can be extended by using
dynamically loaded modules, external scripts, and com-
mands;
• library implementing SNMP services for developing new
applications, with both C and perl application program-
ming interfaces (APIs).
The security model used by Net-SNMP is a user-based secu-
rity model (USM), which is discussed in Section V.
B. NTP
The clock synchronization function, just as it is defined by
IEC 60870-5-104, can be carried out only if the maximum delay
of the network is smaller than the required time accuracy. How-
ever, we cannot ensure it within a wide-area network (WAN).
The solution adopted as an alternative to the clock synchroniza-
tion defined by IEC 60870-5-104 is the implantation of an NTP
synchronization system over the telecontrol network.
The network time protocol (NTP) [24], [25] was designed
to keep synchronization among the elements of a distributed
system by sharing time information in a large and diverse In-
ternet system operating at any speed. The used version of the
protocol is 3.
The Internet standard protocol NTP is able to provide a time
accuracy of 10 ms over the Internet, even in the presence of at-
tacks or failures in clocks, time servers, or the network. This
time accuracy is achieved by a global approach of the system de-
sign, integrating primary time references, time servers, synchro-
nization subnets, protocols, and synchronization mechanisms.
The architecture of a synchronization system based on NTP
consists of a distributed subnet of time servers operating in a
self-organizing and hierarchical configuration, synchronizing
local clocks within the subnet and to national time standards.
These time servers and their clients exchange synchronization
information by means of NTP, over the user datagram pro-
tocol/Internet protocol (UDP/IP).
NTP works correctly in a wide range of computers, from per-
sonal workstation to mainframes. It minimizes the load over the
operative system. Since it is a connectionless protocol, it min-
imizes latency and simplifies implementations. NTP is tolerant
to numerous faults of different types, such as communications,
clocks and servers. Furthermore, it includes mechanisms of pro-
tection against hackers. It also makes up for the effects of the
variable transmission delays between a client and a server within
WAN. All of these reasons make this protocol appropriate for
electrical network telecontrol systems.
These days, NTP is the most spread protocol for distributed
system synchronization, and it works perfectly. As a curiosity,
we can say that NTP is the synchronization protocol used by
NASA spacecrafts [26].
C. SSH
File transfer is carried out by means of SNMPv3 and SSH.
The first protocol is used for exchanging information about the
files to be transferred and the second carries out the transfer of
the files using the command secure copy (SCP).
SSH is defined in the RFCs 4250 to 4256. It allows accessing
remote hosts through a network by means of a secure channel.
It uses public-key cryptography to authenticate the remote com-
puter and to allow this to authenticate the user. SSH provides
confidentiality and integrity of data exchanged between the two
computers using encryption and message authentication codes.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TELECONTROL APPLICATIONS
FUNCTIONS DEFINED BY THE STANDARD IEC 60870-5-104
OVER THE SERVICES OF SNMPv3
This section describes the implementation of those telecon-
trol functions by using the services of the network-management
protocol SNMPv3.
Fig. 2. Comparison of protocol stacks.
Fig. 3. Adaptation of the Internet network-management model to telecontrol
systems.
A. Protocol Stacks
The proposed approach replaces the protocol stack estab-
lished in the standard IEC 60870-5-104 (specific of telecontrol)
that drives the telecontrol communications between RTUs and
control centers by a stack of protocols nonspecific of telecon-
trol. To be exact, the services of SNMPv3, SSH, and NTP are
used to implement the telecontrol application functions defined
by that standard.
Fig. 2 shows protocol stacks and compares them by equating
their equivalent layers. It can be observed that, in our develop-
ment, the services of the application protocols SNMPv3, SSH,
and NTP are used for implementing the telecontrol application
functions defined by IEC 60870-5-104. In this standard, these
functions are defined to work directly over TCP/IP.
B. Architecture of the New System
To implement the telecontrol application functions defined by
the standard IEC 60870-5-104 using the services supplied by the
network-management protocol SNMPv3, the Internet network-
management architecture was adapted to that of a telecontrol
system, as shown in Fig. 3.
Three programs have been developed to test the implemented
functions:
1) Control center: It is an SNMP manager playing the role of
control center (primary station in the nomenclature of the
IEC standard). This process calls the telecontrol functions
initiated by this station.
2) RTU simulator: It is also an SNMP manager implemented
to face with the lack of a real RTU to work with. This
process simulates the behavior of an RTU, generating dif-
ferent kinds of faults and events with a certain probability
and frequency, and reflecting the effect of commands on
the RTU. This process calls the functions initiated by the
RTU.
3) SNMP agent: This process, together with the simulator,
plays the role of secondary station (or RTU). For this pur-
pose, the agent has been extended, including new variables
in its MIB, and giving them a dynamic behavior.
C. RTU’s MIB
The MIB is a fundamental component in this new telecontrol
system. All of the implemented telecontrol functions are carried
out or initiated by means of the MIB. Through it, the control
center and RTU send and receive all of the information they need
to carry out the telecontrol functions. It is stored in the RTU.
Every telecontrol function has an associated variable of status
in this MIB. The transitions in the state machines of each func-
tion are implemented by changes in its variable of status. These
changes can be caused by the control center and the RTU.
Those telecontrol functions that entail telecontrol data ex-
change (DAP, CDT, AE, GI, TIT, PL, and FT) have an additional
variable. This variable is an array of DisplayStrings. The max-
imum length of this array is configurable. All of the telecontrol
data that the control center and the RTU want to exchange are
written in this array.
In addition, every variable in the MIB has a timetick variable
recording the time of its last change.
D. Implementation of the Functions
This section describes the implementation of the telecon-
trol functions defined by the standard IEC 60870-5-104 over
SNMPv3. The philosophy ruling the implementation of all
these different functions is quite homogeneous. For this reason,
the implementation of one of the most used functions, Data
Acquisition by Polling, is shown as a representative example.
As mentioned, the implementation of the telecontrol func-
tions has been carried out by using the MIB. Data Acquisition
by Polling uses the data structure implemented by the subtree
dapIEC in the MIB. The structure of this subtree is shown next:
+–dapIEC(17)
+– -RW- EnumVal dapState(1)
Values: nodata(0), data(1), locked(3)
+– -R– TimeTicks dapStateTT(2)




+– —- INTEGER dapDSInd(1)
+– CR– String dapDS(2)
Textual Convention: DisplayString
Size: 0..1492





The object dapState is an enumerated value reflecting the state
of the RTU with regard to the Data Acquisition by the Polling
function. It can contain the values nodata (there are no data
to reply to a data poll), data (there are some data) and locked
(data are being read or written, so the access to them is locked).
Reading this object while containing the value data causes it to
be assigned the value locked.
The object dapStateTT is the time tag that records the moment
in which dapState was last modified.
The object dapNDS records the number of Display Strings
from the table dapDSTable that must be read by the manager to
obtain the requested data.
The last object of this subtree is the table dapDSTable. It con-
sists of three columns. The first one, called dapDSInd, is the
index identifying the row being accessed. The second, called
dapDS, is a Display String with a maximum length of 1492 B
that contains the necessary information to reply to a Data Ac-
quisition by Polling request. The data that the RTU must send to
the control center are stored in as many dapDS objects as nec-
essary. This information is stored by the RTU in the MIB. The
third column dapDSStatus is an administrative object, necessary
for creating and erasing rows in the table.
The state machines of the processes implementing the con-
trol center (manager) and the RTU (agent and simulator) are
achieved by means of the variable of status. Figs. 4–6 show the
state machine of these processes.
E. Operation in a Real System
This implementation is being installed in a trial system. The
program corresponding to the CC will operate in a PC, while the
one corresponding to the RTU will run in an RTU implemented
in an embedded system [27], [28]. This system is based on an
open core hardware in which Linux has already been installed.
Fig. 4. State machine of the control center for data acquisition by polling.
Fig. 5. State machine of the RTU simulator for data acquisition by polling.
Fig. 6. State machine of the SNMP agent for data acquisition by polling.
V. SECURITY
Security is an important issue in any network, even in an iso-
lated one such as the telecontrol network of a power system.
This kind of network is so large that it is impossible to ensure
that no one will ever be able to physically access wires or even
an RTU. Given the fact that an unauthorized access to the net-
work is possible, it is important to be aware of the risks.
A. Security Threats in Telecontrol Networks
This section outlines the different security threats that can af-
fect a telecontrol network of a power system. Computer network
literature [29] may help to classify these attacks:
Passive Attacks: The main kind of passive attack is eaves-
dropping on transmissions. This does not directly harm because
data traffic on the network is not modified. However, the infor-
mation obtained when eavesdropping could be useful by itself or
might be used to gather information to launch an active attack.
Active Attacks: These involve actively interfering in network
activity, and in most cases, having physical access to some point
in the telecontrol network. Traffic forgery is an active attack
which means that an unauthorized entity is able to modify, in-
sert, or remove traffic from the network. This allows, for ex-
ample, changing orders issued by a control center, or sending a
false alarm to it, or a shutdown command to an RTU. One kind
of traffic forgery is traffic replay. It consists in resending unau-
thorized traffic previously captured by a passive attack.
Eavesdropping and traffic forgery (excepting traffic replay)
can be solved by using cryptography, which includes encryption
and hash algorithms. This usually means sharing a secret key be-
tween the CC and the RTU. This key allows them to communi-
cate securely, even if the network has been tapped. Encryption
renders eavesdropping almost useless because no entity (with
the exception of the real RTU and CC) will be able to understand
the traffic. In this situation, traffic forgery is not possible because
it is not feasible to create a valid message without knowing the
encryption key. Hash algorithms, in combination with encryp-
tion, prevent the unnoticed modification of the traffic.
However, encryption alone is not enough to avoid traffic re-
play. Traffic replay is possible because an attacker is able to
store encrypted traffic and send it later. Even if the attacker does
not know what kind of traffic it is, it will be cryptographically
valid provided that nothing is changed in the stored message.
This means that an attacker could store a shutdown command
and replay it at any moment. If protection against traffic replay
is needed, some kind of timestamp or nonreusable numbering
must be added to the encrypted message so that duplicated mes-
sages could be detected.
B. Security in SNMPv3
SNMPv3 modular design allows choosing a security model
independent of the rest of the architecture. Several security
models [30]–[33] have been proposed for use with SNMPv3,
but only the user security model (USM) has been implemented
in frameworks such as Net-SNMP. The others are either still in
the drafting stage or have been dropped.
USM is defined in RFC3414 and is usually implemented
in many SNMP-capable devices (both software and hardware
based). This security model allows using SNMP with insecure
channels by providing user identity verification, integrity veri-
fication (verifying that the message has not been modified by a
third party), and protection against disclosure of information.
USM also provides protection against replay attacks.
USM allows user-based authentication and access control.
Administrators can create specific accounts for each SNMP user
and grant privileges through those user accounts. This has a
significant impact on the security by increasing accountability
for user actions. It also facilitates the exclusion of a user from
the system without requiring the reconfiguration of all SNMP
devices.
Although USM has been implemented, some concerns have
arisen with its use. These have been studied by an Internet Engi-
neering Task Force (IETF) Working Group (WG) [34]. In accor-
dance with this WG, USM lacks proper user and key manage-
ment, meaning that key and user distribution among the network
(CC and RTU) is inefficient. There are also some concerns with
replay protection, but it is not considered a serious problem be-
cause it can be easily circumvented by adding nonreusable num-
bering in messages, as the WG itself states in [34].
Given the concerns with USM, this WG seeks to deploy a se-
curity module for SNMPv3 capable of integrating an efficient
user and key management. Although External USM (EUSM)
[31] was initially considered to be “the right direction for the
Integrated Security Model for SNMP (ISMS) WG” [35], it was
dropped afterwards [36]. So this WG moved to use the secure
Transport Subsystem [37] and SSH in tunnel mode as the secu-
rity model [38]. As work is still in progress, no final proposal
has been made so far and, as a result, USM is still in use.
Even though USM is not a perfect solution, it is one of the
security models implemented in Net-SNMP. Since the most se-
rious concern with USM is its inadequate key management,
USM applicability will depend on the complexity and the size of
the telecontrol network. If the number of users (operators) and
keys (RTUs and CCs) in use is acceptable, it would be possible
to use USM. As the number of operators and CCs is significantly
lower than that of the RTUs, the latter is decisive. Finding out
how many RTUs are acceptable requires further analysis and is
beyond this paper.
C. Other Alternatives for Security
Using SNMPv3 security extensions is not the only way to
achieve security in a network. There are protocols such as IPsec
[39] or transport-layer security (TLS) [40] which also offer
security services to a network. In these cases, protection is
achieved at the network and at a socket-layer level. This means
that application protocols do not need to support security,
because it is provided by lower-layer protocols. However, since
our proposal is to use SNMPv3 to perform telecontrol func-
tions, we do not see a significant advantage in using either IPsec
or TLS because standard SNMPv3 implementation already
includes the security services described before.
If we use either an implementation of the telecontrol func-
tions over TCP/IP or some mixed scenario (not only SNMPv3),
it would be appropriate to evaluate the use of other security pro-
tocols, such as IPsec or TLS.
D. Concerns With the Use of Open Protocols
The proposal is to use Net-SNMP, NTP, and SSH,
open-source software installed in an open-source operating
system (such as Linux), using well-known cryptographic and
authentication protocols. Therefore, some concerns might arise
because our framework may be the object of the same kind of
attacks as those used in the Internet. Some people might think
it would be better to continue using closed protocols in order
Fig. 7. General format of transport-level traffic comparison for both implemen-
tations of functions bearing telecontrol information.
to keep telecontrol systems secure. While it is true that our
framework might be attacked in the same way as the Internet, it
is untrue that a closed environment will provide more security
to our telecontrol networks.
The question is what kind of framework is more secure: one
using open protocols or other using closed ones? The answer is
none of them. A system, framework, or protocol will be secure
only if it is designed to be secure (i.e., prepared to be attacked);
it does not matter if an open or a closed environment is being
used. In fact, open protocols and, more specifically, open-source
software are considered to be advantageous by certain groups
because the source code may be inspected by everybody and,
thus, be subject to some kind of communitarian audit. However,
this communitarian audit should not be considered as a guar-
antee that a piece of software is secure; it only means that it
may be inspected by anyone.
To summarize, using an open protocol or software does not
increase the threat of being successfully attacked. Improperly
designed software or protocols can be found in open and closed
environments.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the results of the performance analysis are
summarized. To determine the quality of the proposed imple-
mentation (called SNMP implementation from now on), the an-
alyzed performance measurements are compared with those ob-
tained from another implementation by using TCP/IP services,
ruled by the standard IEC 60870-5-104 (called IEC implemen-
tation from now on).
The analyzed measurements are the transport-level traffic
generated by the execution of a particular function and the frac-
tion (percentage) of this traffic bearing telecontrol information
(called useful percentage, from now on). This last measure can
be analyzed only for those functions that entail the exchange of
telecontrol information.
To carry out this performance analysis, the telecontrol ap-
plication functions have been considered in two groups: those
bearing telecontrol information and those which do not. Data
acquisition by polling (DAP), cyclic data transmission (CDT),
acquisition of events (AE), general interrogation (GI), transmis-
sion of integrated totals (TIT), parameter loading (PL), and file
Fig. 8. General format of useful percentage comparison for both implementa-
tions of functions bearing telecontrol information.
TABLE I
FRONTIER AND ASYMPTOTIC VALUES OF USEFUL PERCENTAGE FOR BOTH
IMPLEMENTATIONS OF FUNCTIONS BEARING THE TELECONTROL INFORMATION
transfer (FT) are included in the first group. Station initializa-
tion (SI), command transmission (CT), and test procedure (TP)
are included in the second group.
Fig. 7 represents the general format of transport-level traffic
comparison for the first group of functions. This shows the trans-
port-level traffic generated by the execution of a function for
both implementations.
Fig. 8 represents the general format of useful percentage com-
parison for the first group of functions. This shows the useful
percentage for both implementations of a function.
In these two graphics, we can observe that traffic and useful
percentage present steps for multiples of 1492-B data sizes. This
is a result of the encapsulation of telecontrol information into
MIB variables to transfer it. These MIB variables are Display
Strings with a maximum length of 1492 B, which implies that
every time data size exceeds a multiple of 1492, a new variable
has to be transferred, with the overload in protocol information
needed to request and transfer it. The more data that are con-
tained in this variable approach 1492 B, the higher the useful
percentage that is obtained. This is a configurable size that could
be adapted to specific systems’ necessities. It must minimize the
possibility of transmission error, and should be big enough to
maximize the performance of the protocol.
Another general characteristic of these graphics is that during
a first little interval, the traffic generated by SNMP implemen-
tation slightly exceeds that of the IEC implementation. There-
fore, the useful percentage of the IEC implementation is higher
during this interval. The upper frontier of this interval varies be-
tween 0 and 800 B, depending on the specific function. For file
transfer to primary station (FT-SPP and FT-SPS), the traffic of
SNMP implementation is bigger than that of the IEC implemen-
tation, up to a file size of 3 kB.
For all data sizes over the frontier, the SNMP implementation
performance is always better than that of the IEC implementa-
tion.
For both implementations, the useful percentage of each
function grows to almost stabilize around an asymptotic value.
Table I shows the mentioned frontier and the asymptotic values
of a useful percentage for the functions of the first group.
In this table, we can observe that this asymptotic value is be-
tween 16 and 20 percentage points higher for the SNMP imple-
mentation of DAP, CDT, AE, GI, and TIT. For PL, the difference
is bigger, about 44 points when the PL is initiated by the primary
station (PL-P) and about 79 when it is initiated by the secondary
station (PL-S). For file transfer, the difference exceeds 81 per-
centage points.
The group of functions that do not bear telecontrol informa-
tion includes station initialization (SI), command transmission
(CT), and test procedure (TP). The only analyzed measure for
these functions is traffic. Fig. 9 represents the general format of
traffic comparison for them. This shows the traffic generated by
the execution of a function for both implementations. The three
columns on the left represent traffic for the SNMP implementa-
tion and those three on the right for IEC implementation. Inside
every group of three columns, the outgoing traffic from the pri-
mary station, the incoming traffic for the primary station, and
the total traffic (sum of both) are represented.
Table II shows the total traffic obtained for every function of
the second group.
In this table, we can observe that the traffic for IEC imple-
mentation exceeds that of the SNMP implementation for every
function, ranging from 110 to 321% depending on the func-
tion, expect for the remote initialization of the secondary station
(SI-RISS), where IEC implementation traffic is 72% of that of
the SNMP implementation.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of this work, the following conclusions can be
obtained:
• Electrical network telecontrol systems, in their evolution,
tend to the use of standard protocols to carry out their
Fig. 9. Transport-level traffic comparison for both implementations of function
not bearing telecontrol information.
TABLE II
TOTAL TRAFFIC OBTAINED FOR BOTH IMPLEMENTATIONS OF
THE FUNCTIONS NOT BEARING TELECONTROL INFORMATION
functions. Specifically, European electrical companies are
adopting the standards of IEC 60870-5 series to rule the
communications between control centers and RTUs, and
those of IEC 60870-6 to communications between control
centers.
• As its name suggests, SNMP is a very simple protocol.
Its installation is easy in large networks and the manage-
ment information needing exchange takes a few network
resources.
• SNMPv3 services allow implementing upper functions,
adapting them to the fetch-store paradigm, and to the use
of .
• Since SNMPv3 is really an extended protocol, present in
most of the network systems, its use is not costly in terms
of installation of new applications. In fact, many telecon-
trol networks are managed by SNMPv3. The wide experi-
ence in it makes it robust and well-known since there are
many groups analysing and improving it, in view of its im-
portance in the right operation of the networks in many
organizations.
• The use of Net-SNMP has entailed all the advantages of
mature and extended software, endorsed by a wide and ac-
tive community of users and programmers, willing to coop-
erate in the presence of any problem or doubt. Furthermore,
the use of a free implementation of SNMP dissociates us
from vendors.
• SNMPv3 provides security facilities, such as authentica-
tion, encryption and timeliness checking. The implemen-
tation of telecontrol application functions using SNMPv3
services solves completely and satisfactorily the serious
problems of security that IEC 60870-5-104 presents.
• The performance analysis determines a higher perfor-
mance for SNMPv3 implementation in most cases.
• This approach could be applied to other fields of telecontrol
besides electrical networks, such as industry or intelligent
home.
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